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Worker Characteristics and Wage Differentials: 




There is ample empirical evidence indicating that a substantial fraction of the population 
exhibits social preferences. Recent work also shows that social preferences  influence the 
effectiveness of incentives in labor relations. Hence when making contracting  decisions, 
employers should take into account that workers are heterogenous with respect to both their 
productivity and their social preferences. This paper presents causal evidence that they do. In 
a real-effort experiment, we elicit measures of workers’ productivity and trustworthiness and 
make this information available to potential employers. Our data show that employers pay 
significant wage premia for both traits. Firms make highest profits with trustworthy workers, 
in particular with highly productive and trustworthy workers. We also document differences 
in the strength of gift exchange across worker types. In particular, output and profit levels of 
trustworthy workers are less dispersed than those of not-trustworthy workers. 
JEL-Code: C910, J410, D860. 
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contracts. 
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Firms spend substantial resources to select the “best” candidate for a job. In particular, an
increasing fraction of ﬁrms uses both ability and personality tests in their hiring processes,
see, e.g., Autor and Scarborough (2008). While the rationale for selecting the most “able”
candidate is obvious, labor economists have traditionally focused on productivity as the only
dimension of ability. So what information about workers might a ﬁrm obtain from personal-
ity tests and job interviews that is not just a measure of productivity? One important piece
of additional information about a potential worker are her social preferences. In particular
in the presence of moral hazard, it is valuable for ﬁrms to have access to employees that can
be motivated by “social incentives” via gift exchange.1
Despite the importance of information acquisition in real world contracting, our understand-
ing of the impact of the availability of information on the terms of a contract is surprisingly
limited. Empirical evidence on the issue is scarce. This paper aims to ﬁll this gap. We pro-
vide causal evidence from a laboratory experiment on how principals (employers) use speciﬁc
pieces of information about agents (workers) when they design contracts in a gift-exchange
situation. Speciﬁcally, we elicit measures of workers’ productivity and trustworthiness and
make this information available to potential employers. Our data show that employers pay
signiﬁcant wage premia for both traits. Thus, individuals seem to understand that there is
heterogeneity among workers not only with respect to productivity but also with respect to
their social preferences, and they take these social preferences into account when making
contract oﬀers.
Research Question When making employment and contracting decisions, ﬁrms natu-
rally desire to minimize the risk of hiring an unsuitable candidate. They try to learn about
the qualiﬁcation of a candidate, his education, his family background, etc. before oﬀering
an employment contract. As a necessary simpliﬁcation of reality, we concentrate in our
experiment on two dimensions of information that we regard as essential on real world la-
1Englmaier and Leider (2011) is a recent theoretical treatment of the issue. Dur and Sol (2010) and
Mohnen et al. (2008) are examples of experimental studies that highlight that the selection of the workers
exhibiting social preferences enhances outcomes in team production situations. We review this literature in
more detail below.
2bor markets. The ﬁrst dimension, which we call productivity, is an objective assessment
of whether the candidate is good at the job he is supposed to accomplish. In the second
dimension, a measure of trustworthiness is supposed to capture the candidate’s social and
reciprocal preferences. We consider these two measures of a worker’s traits the most relevant
“skills” in our setting, and we expect that information about these skills matters for ﬁrms.
In a situation characterized by moral hazard, we expect both elements to play an important
part in the eﬀort decision of the agent and hence for the outcome for the principal: Con-
trolling for social preferences, an agent who is more productive at accomplishing a certain
task will produce a higher outcome for the principal. Similarly, for given productivity, a
reciprocal agent will put in more eﬀort in response to a “generous” wage oﬀer leading to a
higher outcome for the principal. We examine if this behavior is anticipated by ﬁrms and if
it aﬀects wages.
In this article, we concentrate on a contracting situation where information about a worker
stems from sources external to the ﬁrm-worker relationship. In contrast to earlier studies
by Brown et al. (2004) or Bartling et al. (2011), we abstract from information about the
worker that arises endogenously in a repeated relationship and can be used for ﬁrms to
adapt contracts over time. We focus on the trade-oﬀ between two pieces of information and
their impact on contracting behavior by both principals and agents in a one-shot interaction.
The main research question we have in mind is whether these two pieces of information are
conditioned upon when writing contracts and to what extent they can be used to predict
behavior. Eventually, we evaluate how the presence of certain skill sets and available infor-
mation about them shapes labor contracts under moral hazard. The high degree of control
makes the laboratory an ideal setting to address these questions.
Design Our experiment consists of two parts, which are presented sequentially to subjects
such that they do not know what will be the content of the next part. Subjects know in
advance, however, that decisions in earlier parts may have an impact on later parts. In the
ﬁrst part, subjects work on a real eﬀort task under a piece rate contract. We use their score
in this piece rate task as our measure of productivity. Subsequently, subjects are presented
with a binary, neutrally framed, trust game which we use to proxy for social and reciprocal
3concerns. In the second part, half of the players are randomly assigned to be employers
and the other half to be employees. Subjects play a one-shot gift exchange game where the
employer ﬁrst oﬀers the employee a ﬂat wage and the employee thereafter performs the real
eﬀort task from the ﬁrst part under standard gift-exchange incentives. Before making their
wage oﬀers, principals are presented with the information about workers from the elicitation
tasks. The level of information provided to ﬁrms is our treatment variable. In our main
treatment, employers are presented the productivity and the trustworthiness measure in a
binary way (hereafter treatment PT) before submitting wage oﬀers. To control for strategic
behavior in the elicitation phases, we run two control treatments where only one piece of
information is made available to ﬁrms. In treatment “Productivity”(hereafter P) they are
only presented the productivity measure, and in treatment “Trustworthiness” (hereafter T)
they are only presented the trustworthiness measure. By comparing our treatments P and T
to the PT treatment, we can control if the information revelation in the ﬁnal phase distorts
the elicited measures in phases 1 and 2. In P (T) it is communicated to subjects that in
the second part only information from the elicitation of productivity (trustworthiness) is
possibly made available in later parts of the experiment, whereas in PT this applies for both
measures. We do not ﬁnd any indication of strategic distortions.
Results Along the two dimensions productivity and trustworthiness we categorize workers
into four categories: high productivity & trustworthy, high productivity & not trustworthy,
low productivity & trustworthy, low productivity & not trustworthy. We document four main
ﬁndings. 1) Contracts oﬀered by principals systematically vary with the information they
have about the agent. Principals tailor their wage oﬀers to employee types, oﬀering more
generous contracts to more productive and more trustworthy subjects. 2) Higher wages pre-
dict higher output. While trustworthiness and productivity also predict output, they do not
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect once the wage (that already contains information about these traits)
is included in the regression. This result is consistent with the interpretation that wages
are already set close to their optimal levels conditional on worker characteristics. 3) Firms’
proﬁts vary across worker types. While the remaining three types produce similar output
levels, the high productivity & trustworthy workers generate signiﬁcantly higher proﬁts. 4)
4Output and proﬁts are much less dispersed for trustworthy workers. This results is driven by
the fact that trustworthy workers in the Gift-Exchange Game produce systematically much
closer to their elicited productivity in the piece rate task. The nature of gift exchange varies
markedly across the four worker types.
Related Literature Following the arguments by Akerlof (1982), an extensive experimen-
tal literature documents incentives and behavior in gift exchange games, see e.g. Fehr et al.
(1993), Fehr et al. (1997). This protocol has proven to be a valuable paradigm that captures
incentives on real world labor markets in the laboratory. As a major ﬁnding of this literature,
preferences for fairness and reciprocity serve as a powerful source of motivation to overcome
the informational asymmetry between principals and agents on labor markets2. These lab-
oratory studies have also been validated in the ﬁeld; see e.g. Falk (2007) or Bellemare and
Shearer (2009). It is now also widely acknowledged that social preferences like reciprocity
or inequity aversion potentially do not only shape market outcomes or the result of bilat-
eral bargaining, but have an important eﬀect on the design of optimal incentive schemes
as well.3 One additional important empirical ﬁnding from both ﬁeld and laboratory data
(e.g. Dohmen et al. (2009)) is that there is substantial heterogeneity with respect to the
prevalence of reciprocal inclinations and social preferences among the population, see Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) or Fischbacher et al. (2001).
Recent theoretical and experimental work suggests that there are complementarities from
matching incentive structures to worker types; e.g. Ichniowski et al. (1997); Englmaier and
Leider (2011) or Bartling et al. (2011). However, little work has been done that tests how
worker characteristics (amongst them social preferences, if measured) relate to behavior
across games and, more to our point, how worker types interact with incentives. One recent
important exception is a paper by Cabrales et al. (2010) who design an experiment where
in the ﬁrst phase, all subjects choose a payoﬀ vector and play a self-chosen eﬀort game.
From these choices their preference parameters in terms of both outcome preferences and
reciprocal inclination are estimated, assuming preferences ` a la Charness and Rabin (2002).
2For references see Fehr and G¨ achter (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (2003) or Fehr and Falk (2008).
3See Itoh (2004), Dur and Glazer (2008), Englmaier and Wambach (2010) or Englmaier and Leider (2011)
for theoretical treatments and Fehr et al. (2007) for experimental evidence.
5In the second phase, it is documented that these estimated preferences predict behavior in
a gift exchange game conditional on contract oﬀers. Moreover, contract oﬀers vary system-
atically with estimated preferences of principals. However, Cabrales et al. (2010) do neither
use a real eﬀort task (and hence they do not elicit measures about productivity), nor is
information about workers presented to the principals prior to their contract oﬀers. We con-
sider this last feature essential for our understanding of the functioning of real world labor
markets. Most closely related to our study, Dohmen and Falk (2011) design a laboratory
experiment where they elicit worker characteristics to explain sorting behavior of subjects
into variable or ﬁxed-payment incentive schemes. They ﬁnd strong evidence for worker sort-
ing along multiple dimensions, but claim that ”many of the discussed worker attributes are
typically unobservable in the hiring process“ (p.558). While this is certainly the case for
some attributes that are diﬃcult to observe, we argue that proxies for the most important
skills of a worker are well available to ﬁrms before hiring a worker, e.g. in the form of a
curriculum vitae or the results from hiring tests. We therefore complement their analysis by
showing how the presence of information about these attributes interacts with incentives on
the labor market.4
Evidence from the ﬁeld suggests that ﬁrms use available or acquired information about work-
ers and applicants for screening purposes and to tailor incentive schemes in the presence of
moral hazard, see e.g. Ichniowski et al. (1997); Huang and Cappelli (2010). In particular in
ﬁrms’ hiring decisions there is evidence for the extensive use of personality tests (see Autor
and Scarborough, 2008) and the screening for personality traits like honesty or cooperative-
ness (see Guion and Gottier, 1965; Sackett and Wanek, 1996; Salgado et al., 2003).5
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to focus on the pure eﬀect of the availability
4A related literature on cognitive and non-cognitive skills focuses on the relation between these two skill
sets and their interdependence, see e.g. Heckman et al. (2006), Borghans et al. (2008b), and their relationship
to labor market outcomes, see e.g. Murnane et al. (1995), Borghans et al. (2008a), Heineck and Anger (2010).
5Our paper adds to another strand of literature that assesses the eﬀects of the availability of potentially
costly information about an interaction partner on subsequent strategic behavior. Kurzban and DeScioli
(2008) show that subjects in public goods game buy information about behavior of others in previous round
to adjust their behavior. More recently, Eckel and Petrie (2011) give subjects the possibility to purchase a
picture of the interaction partner in a trust game before deciding about trust and trustworthiness. They
ﬁnd that there is informational value in a counterpart’s face since many subjects do purchase the picture at
nonzero costs.
6of information about interaction partners on contracting outcomes in a one-shot moral haz-
ard situation. A controlled laboratory study allows us to exogenously vary the information
structure and eliminate eﬀects of worker competition.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental
design. In section 3 we lay out our hypotheses and section 4 presents the results of the
experiments. Section 5 discusses our ﬁndings and concludes.
2 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of two parts, which are presented sequentially to subjects such that
they do not know what will be the content of the next part. Subjects knew in advance,
however, that their decisions earlier on may potentially be disclosed to other subjects later
on of the experiment. Overall, we ran 12 sessions with a total of 288 subjects in June
and July 2011 at the MELESSA laboratory at LMU Munich. The subjects were invited
via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), and the experiment was implemented with zTree (Fischbacher,
2007). Subjects earned experimental points (EP) during the experiment. The exchange
rate from EP to Euros was 1EP = 0.0125 €. The experiment lasted about 60 minutes and
subjects earned on average 11.8 €.
2.1 Elicitation of Productivity and Trustworthiness
In a ﬁrst part of the experiment, measures of both productivity and trustworthiness are
elicited from all subjects. We proxy productivity with a measure from a real eﬀort task
that consists in matching words and a four-digit code from a list.6 A screenshot of the
experimental screen of the coding task can be found in the Appendix (Screenshot S.1).
Subjects perform this task for 90 seconds and are paid a piece-rate per correct answer of
10 EP that is paid out at the end of the experiment. To discourage guessing there is a
penalty for every wrong answer of 10 EP, which is known to subjects. Our measure of
productivity therefore consists in the number of correctly matched codes after subtracting
6We conduct a trial period before the elicitation task to familiarize subjects with the computer program.
7all wrong answers, i.e. the net correct answers.
#net correct answers = #right answers − #wrong answers
There is no particular training required for fulﬁlling this task and we assume that all subjects
put in full eﬀort under the piece rate scheme such that our measure of productivity is as
closely related to underlying ability as possible. In the remainder of the analysis, we therefore
refer to ”productivity“ as the number of net correct answers in this task. The corresponding
payoﬀ from this part is calculated as follows according to the number of net correct answers:
10 EP ∗ (#net correct answers)
Subjects are presented three screens of 30 seconds each one after another, i.e. a total of 90
seconds, with randomly generated words and codes for every new screen.7 We conjecture
that intrinsic costs for the task are linear over the interval of 90 seconds, i.e. there are no
eﬀects from fatigue or boredom. The resolution of the number of correct answers is given to
subjects only at the end of the experiment.
Subsequently, subjects play a standard binary trust game in neutral framing to provide a
measure of trust and trustworthiness at the individual level; see Figure 1 for the precise
amounts used in the trust game. We make use of the strategy method to get data on both
trusting behavior and trustworthiness. Subjects take both decisions for both roles and at the
end of the experiment they are matched with another subject, roles are randomly determined
and payoﬀs are realized according to the decisions taken in the respective roles. Behavior in
the trust game can be seen as indicative whether individual preferences are characterized by
high or low levels of trust and trustworthiness when engaging in an interaction with another
person. We focus on the trustworthiness of subjects as this appears as a more relevant proxy
of social and reciprocal concerns in the gift exchange game than the initial trusting decision.
--- Include Figure 1 about here. ---
7A screenshot of the real eﬀort task can be found in the Appendix (Screenshot S.1).
8Importantly, there was no feedback given to subjects about the elicitation procedures (and
the resulting payoﬀs) until the very end of the experiment such that subjects’ subsequent
behavior in the experiment was not aﬀected. We also elicit all subjects’ detailed expectations
about productivity and trustworthiness in the population. Since they turn out not to matter
for the subsequent experiment, we relegate the description of the experimental protocol and
the results on expectations in the Appendix.
2.2 Gift-Exchange Game
In the second phase of the experiment, an experimental gift exchange game is implemented
in which the task to be fulﬁlled is identical to the real eﬀort task in the ﬁrst part of the
experiment. Subjects are randomly allocated to be either a ﬁrm or a worker. Overall, there
are 12 workers and 12 ﬁrms per session. We employ the strategy method, i.e. ﬁrms have
to submit a binding wage oﬀer for each of the 12 workers such that we obtain the full wage
proﬁle ﬁrms are submitting for all workers in their market.8 After all wage oﬀers have been
submitted, every worker is matched randomly to a single ﬁrm, i.e. every ﬁrm hires only one
worker. Workers learn only the wage oﬀer that their matched ﬁrm has determined for them
before they start working for their ﬁrm. There is no possibility for workers to be inﬂuenced
by oﬀers that the ﬁrm has submitted for other workers or by oﬀers that other ﬁrms have
submitted to them. Subsequently, workers perform the same real eﬀort task from the ﬁrst
part for 90 seconds. The interaction is one-shot to preclude any eﬀects of repetition over
time and to focus in the cleanest possible way on the eﬀects of information on contracting
behavior.
Workers’ performance then determines the payout to the ﬁrm according to the following
formula
ﬁrm payoﬀ = 10 EP · (#net correct answers) − wage
where # net correct answers is given by all solved matches minus all wrong matches. Workers
are paid their predetermined ﬁxed wage and have non-monetary costs of eﬀort from solving
8A screenshot of the wage setting screen can be found in the Appendix (Screenshot S.2).
9the task:
worker payoﬀ = wage.
To avoid that subjects can ruin ﬁrms by deliberately giving wrong answers we impose a
lower limit for the payoﬀ to the ﬁrm from the task at 0. This does not preclude ﬁrms from
making losses if the wage exceeds the revenues generated by their worker. Losses had to
be paid from earnings in other parts of the experiment. Given the nature of the task and
the fact that new words and codes are randomly generated for every screen, there should be
virtually no learning possibilities from doing the task a second time. After the real eﬀort
task is completed, there is feedback about the number of correct answers and the payoﬀ to
the ﬁrm and the worker. Both ﬁrms and workers learn only the details from their interaction,
but not from the interaction between any other ﬁrm-worker pair.
Treatments
Our treatment variation consists in the pieces of information elicited in the ﬁrst part from
the experiment that are made available to ﬁrms when submitting their wage proﬁles. In
our main treatment PT, information about productivity and trustworthiness is available in a
binary way. Information about productivity is given to ﬁrms in the form of whether a worker
has achieved a productivity score in the coding task which is higher than the mean of all
subjects in the respective session, or below that mean. Information about trustworthiness is
given in the form of the binary decision as trustee in the trust game, i.e. either whether a
subject returned trust or not. To preclude framing eﬀects, both pieces of information were
given in a neutral way, i.e. in the trust game the actual information was labeled “left” or
“right” depending on whether subjects opted for the left or the right branch of the game
tree. For the productivity measure, subjects were divided into two groups labeled “blue” or
“yellow” which was explained to subjects.
To control for strategic eﬀects in the elicitation phases of our two measures, we conduct
two control treatments where we make only one piece of information accessible to ﬁrms. In
treatment P, information about productivity only is available and in treatment T information
10about trustworthiness only is available, which is told to subjects. Somewhat diﬀerent from
standard control treatments, P and T therefore exclusively serve as a control for the results
from the elicitation phases.
We conduct 8 sessions of the main PT treatment (192 subjects) and 2 sessions each (48
subjects) of the two control treatments P and T.
3 Hypotheses
In this section, we sketch a stylized agency model for workers who are heterogeneous with
respect to productivity and trustworthiness (assuming stable preferences and productivity
types); the model is a simpliﬁed version of Englmaier and Leider (2011). A ﬁrm hires a
worker for a ﬁxed wage w which is binding. The interaction is one shot, eﬀort e is not
contractible and there are no contingent contracts. The ﬁrm relies on gift exchange to elicit
performance. Exerting eﬀort has convex costs of eﬀort
c(e)
p for the worker where p with p > 0
is the worker’s productivity; i.e., a more productive worker has lower (marginal) costs to
exert eﬀort. Output π is not contractible but assumed to accrue deterministically according
to π(e) = e. Firm proﬁts are then π − w = e − w and the worker’s utility u(w) is given by
u(w) = w + η(w − o)(e − w) −
c(e)
p




where η captures the worker’s reciprocal inclination, and o is the outside option which we
normalize to 0. We abstract from explicitly modeling feelings of negative reciprocity but
focus on positive reciprocity between ﬁrms and workers, i.e. η ≥ 0 since in our setting as a
worker there are no possibilities for punishing the ﬁrm other than shirking (e = 0).
In order to elicit a positive eﬀort response the worker has to receive a wage “gift”, i.e. a
wage exceeding his outside option. When the reciprocal worker receives a positive wage gift
his utility increases in the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. For convex costs, the Second Order Condition is
globally satisﬁed, hence the First Order Condition is necessary and suﬃcient for an optimal
11response and implicitly deﬁnes the worker’s best response e∗:
c
0(e
∗) = η · w · p (FOCGE) (1)
Compare this with the optimal eﬀort choice of the worker under the piece rate incentives
(PR) in part 1 where the worker maximizes his utility uPR = e−c(e) and his optimal eﬀort
choice e∗




PR) = 1. (2)
Comparing (1) and (2) immediately implies the following Lemma:
Lemma 1 As long as 1 > η · w · p it will hold that e∗
PR > e∗.
I.e., as long as the wage, the productivity and the reciprocal inclination are not suﬃciently
large, we will see lower eﬀort levels in the gift exchange situation in the second part than
under piece rates in the ﬁrst part of the experiment.
Now turn attention to the eﬃcacy of gift exchange. Applying the Implicit Function Theorem












= sgn(η · p) = +1 (3)
which is summarized in the next lemma:
Lemma 2 If η > 0 there will be gift exchange, meaning that the exerted eﬀort will increase
in the wage.
Now we proceed and analyze whether the eﬃcacy of gift exchange varies across worker types.
To do so we check how ∂e∗
∂w varies when either p or η are varied. The full derivative, derived




































Contrary to the ﬁrst intuition it is not obviously the case that there is more gift exchange
(meaning a steeper wage-eﬀort relationship) for more reciprocal or more productive agents.
In particular, for increasingly convex cost functions, c000(e) > 0, it might be the case that,
e.g., more reciprocal subjects react less strongly in response to a given wage increase. Note
however, this is a statement in slopes, not levels. I.e., in general more reciprocal (productive)
agents will ceteris paribus provide higher eﬀort levels. A good way to get an intuition for
this result is to think of workers having two modes of working; either they exert a lot of
eﬀort or they shirk. So ceteris paribus more reciprocal (productive) agents are more likely
to be in the high eﬀort mode. Hence, they are less likely to be able to respond to a wage
increase by increasing their eﬀort level beyond their peak performance.







Finally we can address the optimal wage setting policy for ﬁrms conditional on diﬀerent
worker types. Firms maximize proﬁts, e − w, by setting w subject to the agents optimal
response. Given the experimental setting we disregard the participation constraint and focus
on the incentive constraint. We use the First Order Approach and replace the incentive
constraint with the First Order Condition from the agent’s optimization problem, (1).
max
w e − w
s.t. c
0(e) = η · w · p.
13Forming the Lagrangian and taking derivatives we get the First Order Condition
∂e∗
∂w





which we can rearrange to
η · p
c00(e)
− 1 − (1 + λ) · η · p = 0 (FOCFirm) (5)




Now we can again apply the Implicit Function Theorem to derive optimal wage adjustments
to diﬀerent worker types, ∂w∗
∂p or ∂w∗
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∂p
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p · c00(e) − η · p · c000(e)∂e
∂η
(c00(e))
2 − (1 + λ) · p

.
We can derive from above that ∂e
∂p =
η·w
c00(e) and that ∂e
∂η =
p·w



























2 − (1 + λ) · p

.
I.e., it is a priori unclear whether ﬁrms should set higher wages for more reciprocal or more
productive workers. In particular, if the eﬀort costs are very convex, it might be that it is
optimal to set rather low wages to those workers. The intuition is clear. If the eﬀort costs are
14very convex then it is extremely hard to elicit eﬀort beyond a threshold. Then the beneﬁt
of more reciprocal or more productive workers comes from the lower wage that is necessary
to bring them to exert eﬀort up to this threshold.
Lemma 4 Firms will set higher wages for more reciprocal workers only if




2 − (1 + λ) · η > 0,
and for more productive workers only if




2 − (1 + λ) · p > 0 holds.
The two elicited measures in our experiment are proxying p through the productivity measure
and η through behavior in the trust game. As in treatment PT proxies for p and η are
available to ﬁrms, we expect according eﬀects on oﬀered wages, eﬀorts, and proﬁts. We
summarize those in the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 In treatment PT, we expect above minimum eﬀort. In general, we expect
eﬀort to be below the performance in the piece rate treatment. This performance gap will be
smaller for more reciprocal workers.
Hypothesis 2 In treatment PT, we expect wage oﬀers and performance in the gift exchange
game to vary with workers’ types. We expect higher output from more reciprocal and more
productive workers.
Hypothesis 3 In treatment PT, we expect positive gift exchange, i.e. a positive eﬀort re-
sponse to a wage increase.
Hypothesis 4 In treatment PT, we expect higher proﬁts from more reciprocal and more
productive workers.
154 Experimental Results
4.1 Part One: Elicitation of Productivity and Trustworthiness
We start by reporting summary statistics for the coding task performance in part one from
treatments PT, P and T. Subjects receive three screens with 15 matches each such that the
maximum attainable is 45 correct answers. Only two out of 288 subjects succeeded in giving
all 45 answers within 90 seconds correctly such that time was indeed the limiting factor and
the way productivity was measured does not harm high productivity subjects. The average
number of correct answers given was slightly below 29 with a standard deviation of about 7
answers.
--- Include Table 1 about here. ---
Table 1 shows summary statistics and illustrates that there are no diﬀerences across treat-
ments with all treatments being almost identical in terms of the main statistics. We par-
ticularly do not ﬁnd any evidence that subjects in the two control treatments (P and T)
behave diﬀerently than in our main treatment PT. We can therefore exclude that workers
behave strategically to signal to potential future employers as a model of career concerns
would predict. The distribution of correct answers in all treatments is symmetric around the
mean, but normality is rejected by all conventional tests; see Figure 2.
--- Include Figure 2 about here. ---
As a further robustness check, we regress the coding outcome on a number of socio-demographics
to see whether there is explanatory power from gender, age, subject of study or the treat-
ment. We also control for ﬁve character traits in the framework of the Big Five Personality
Test that we elicited in a control questionnaire at the end of the experiment. Table 2 clearly
indicates that there is no eﬀect from gender nor from a quantitative orientation in the subject
of study (economics, mathematics, natural sciences) on the performance in the task. Apart
from some negative eﬀect of age and the positive impact of the character trait “agreableness”,
there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect from the four other elicited personality traits from the Big Five
16Index on coding task performance either. More importantly as the treatment P/T dummies
are insigniﬁcant, the regressions conﬁrm that there is no distortion from strategic concerns
between the treatments (and hence diﬀerent levels of information disclosure) on the outcome
of the productivity task.
--- Include Table 2 about here. ---
For the second dimension of information, we let subjects play a binary trust game presented
to them in a neutral frame. Since we employ the strategy method, we have data on choice
behavior in both roles of the trust game for every subject. Table 3 displays the percentage
of subjects’ behavior in the trust game per treatment.
--- Include Table 3 about here. ---
According to our measure, about one third of all subjects can be considered selﬁsh in the
sense that they neither trust others nor do they return trust as a trustee. In a similar vein,
about one third of subjects appears to have other-regarding concerns such that they both
trust and return trust. The remaining third either trusts but does not return trust or vice
versa. Although there is some variation across the treatments, these patterns are quite stable
in all three treatments. Subject to the population averages, not to trust is indeed optimal for
selﬁsh subjects and cannot be rationalized by choosing to trust for strategic reasons. What
is important to note is that about half of all subjects trusted and also about 50 % of all
subjects returned trust while about 50 % did not return trust. That is to say that our design
succeeds in creating variation across subjects which makes information about other subjects
valuable for the ﬁrm-worker interaction. If in the population our binary measure of social
and reciprocal concerns was distributed less symmetric, the value of the information would
clearly decline – if not vanish – when certain character traits were only to show up in small
minorities of the underlying population.
--- Include Table 4 about here. ---
17Since we deem the decision of returning trust as more indicative of an individual’s concern
for reciprocity in the gift-exchange game, we focus in the remainder of the analysis mainly
on the behavior of subjects as a second mover in the described trust game. We control for
the impact of the same socio-demographics on trustworthiness in a probit regression; the
results can be found in Table 4. We ﬁnd a positive gender and age eﬀect on trustworthiness,
but there is no treatment eﬀect between PT and P/T. A quantitative subject of study
decreases the probability of returning trust and all personality traits are insigniﬁcant with
the exception of ”conscientiousness“. We also control for the number of correct answers in
part one on the propensity to reciprocate trust, but do not ﬁnd any eﬀect which conﬁrms
that there is no relationship between our measure of productivity and reciprocal behavior
in part one. The independence of our two measures is also supported by a nonparametric
Spearman rank correlation test that yields p = 0.82 for the correlation coeﬃcient; this is
illustrated in Figure 3. We summarize these ﬁndings in our ﬁrst result.
--- Include Figure 3 about here. ---
Result 1 There are no diﬀerences across treatments in personal traits for individual pro-
ductivity and reciprocal concerns. The two measures quantify two distinct dimensions of a
person’s characteristics.
4.2 Part Two: Gift Exchange Game
We subsequently present the results from the ﬁrm-worker interaction, where initially, i.e.
before the measures are elicited, all workers were told which set of information would be
disclosed to ﬁrms. This set of information consisted in
• worker productivity from part one (in treatments PT and P) and
• the decision whether to return trust or not in part one (in treatments PT and T).
Firms do not have any experience or knowledge on how workers behave such that we consider
ﬁrms’ wage policies as the cleanest possible measure of their preferences for information about
18workers.
In the analysis of the data from the gift-exchange game, we will focus on the PT sessions
where both measures about workers were revealed to ﬁrms in a binary way. We will also
comment on the results of the two control treatments P and T, but since the set of information
ﬁrms could condition their wage policy on is smaller, we refrain from directly comparing
decisions in P or T with PT.
4.2.1 Firm Behavior
We begin by looking at wage oﬀers received by workers. Wages were bounded to be not
negative and not above 250 such that the equal surplus split under maximum eﬃciency was
achievable through a non-maximal wage oﬀer.9 Every worker obtained one oﬀer from each
of the 12 ﬁrms, but just received and saw the relevant wage level for him, that the matched
ﬁrm had entered for him in the wage setting stage. As a consequence, we can analyze all 12
wage oﬀers directed to a worker through the strategy method, i.e. we have 96 ∗ 12 = 1152
observations in the PT treatment. The average wage that was submitted to one single worker
was 82.5, whereas the average of the actually randomly determined relevant wage oﬀer was
80.7. The percentage of workers that returned trust in part one was 52.1 %.
The level of performance10 in the gift exchange game by subjects is 21.7 and signiﬁcantly
lower than the elicited productivity measures in part one of 28.0 (Wilcoxon signed-ranks
test, p < 0.01). Hence, there is evidence that subjects do not put in unconditionally full
eﬀort levels in the gift-exchange phase. Furthermore, we see that the random attribution of
roles to workers and ﬁrms has not distorted our two measures in the sense that the sample
means of a session (24 subjects) lie close to the means of the workers (12 subjects). To get
a deeper understanding on how ﬁrms set wages in PT, we run a series of ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect
regressions that predict the wage oﬀer to a speciﬁc worker; results are reported in Table 5.
9We refer to an outcome where the worker gives the maximum of 45 correct answers and receives a wage
of 225, which would yield a payoﬀ of 225 to both the ﬁrm and the worker.
10In what follows, we term “performance” the number of correct answers given by workers in the gift
exchange relation with ﬁrms, to draw a clear semantic distinction to the measure of “productivity” in part
one.
19--- Include Table 5 about here. ---
We ﬁnd a positive impact of being a high productivity and a trustworthy worker on the oﬀered
wage level, which is highly signiﬁcant for both traits in speciﬁcation I. When comparing the
relative sizes, it is immediate to see that employers provide a higher wage premium for the
productivity measure than for the trustworthiness measure. The wage premium is more
than twice as high for the productivity measure compared to the trustworthiness measure.
In speciﬁcation II, we divide all workers into four categories. To do so, we classify a worker
as being of “high productivity” or “low productivity” as well as being “trustworthy” or “not
trustworthy”. The left out category is a worker who is neither of high productivity nor
trustworthy. We conﬁrm the ﬁndings of speciﬁcation I, i.e. the presence of information
about each dimension of a worker increases the wage a ﬁrm oﬀers in the ﬁrst place. All three
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other (t-test between two coeﬃcients, all
three tests below p = 0.0042) indicating that there is little substitution of the wage premia
between the two dimensions. If a worker moves from the lower to the higher category in
one dimension, this yields a constant wage premium regardless of her position in the other
category. These results support our hypothesis from section 3 for the impact of information
on wage setting behavior by ﬁrms.
Result 2 Firms are willing to pay a signiﬁcant wage premium for both characteristics. The
premium for being a high productivity worker amounts to roughly double the premium for
being trustworthy.
We also explore whether a ﬁrm’s wage oﬀer is, next to worker characteristics, also aﬀected
by the ﬁrm’s own characteristics (own coding task performance and behavior in the trust
game, gender, age, ﬁeld of study). All these turn out to be insigniﬁcant. Table 6 contains
these results.
--- Include Table 6 about here. ---
In the two control treatments P and T, information about one dimension of worker character-
istics is not available to ﬁrms. When we run identical ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects regressions for these
20two treatments, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant wage premium for productivity in the P treatment, but
not for trustworthiness. In the T treatment, there is a positive premium for being trustwor-
thy, but this is not signiﬁcant. As expected, there is no wage premium for productivity in
T. We take this as further evidence that information about workers matters for wage oﬀers,
but more so for the productivity dimension than for the measure of trustworthiness; results
are reported in Table 7. We next look at worker behavior in terms of eﬀort provision.
--- Include Table 7 about here. ---
4.2.2 Worker Behavior
With respect to eﬀort levels, the question arises of what inﬂuences workers most in their
decision to provide eﬀort. Along the lines of the gift exchange literature, one can argue
that the main driving force will be a high wage oﬀer such that subjects reciprocate by
exerting high levels of eﬀort. This notwithstanding, the characteristics of a person in terms
of productivity and intrinsic willingness to perform well at a given task can similarly aﬀect
actual eﬀort levels. To ﬁnd out more about which of these rationales helps to explain worker
behavior in the working phase, we regress the number of correct answers on the oﬀered wage,
both measures of worker characteristics and a set of controls which are reported in Table 8.
--- Include Table 8 about here. ---
We ﬁnd that the oﬀered wage has a highly signiﬁcant positive impact on the amount of
eﬀort, which we take as a clear sign that gift-exchange considerations play a role in our
real-eﬀort experiment. Controlling for the wage which already includes information about
worker types, a higher productivity measure from part one does not increase the perfor-
mance in the interaction between ﬁrms and workers. However, reciprocal concerns among
workers (i.e. being trustworthy) are predictive for the eﬀort decision. A worker that has
returned trust in part one of the experiment, gives on average 4.5 more correct answers than
a worker who has not returned trust. While there is an eﬀect in wage levels, there is no
eﬀect in slopes as the interaction of the worker characteristics with the wage turns out to be
21insigniﬁcant (speciﬁcation III). This is indicative of wages being set optimally by ﬁrms with
all informational value from types already incorporated into the wage oﬀer. When we con-
trol for other socio-demographic characteristics of workers, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant gender
and age, but a signiﬁcantly negative quantitative dummy in speciﬁcation III. There is no
evidence for a relationship between performance and characteristics in excess of the wage.
This is underlined by speciﬁcation II where in the absence of the relevant wage, personal
characteristics are highly signiﬁcant predictors for worker performance – a relationship that
vanishes in speciﬁcation III. We summarize this in our next result.
Result 3 The wage oﬀer has a signiﬁcant impact on performance in the gift exchange game.
We do not ﬁnd an additional positive impact from worker’s characteristics on performance
in excess of the one already embodied in the wage oﬀer.
4.2.3 Performance of Wage Contracts in the Gift Exchange Game
Putting the wage setting decision by ﬁrms and the worker’s eﬀort decision together, we turn
to the analysis of the proﬁtability of ﬁrm’s wage policies given the information they have
about workers. We pool all contracts concluded in the full information treatment PT and
allocate all workers into the four above mentioned broad categories.11
--- Include Table 9 about here. ---
Table 9 shows the key summary statistics for all 96 concluded contracts in the PT treatment.
We ﬁnd that particularly the interaction of both worker characteristics produces high levels
of performance from workers (i.e. the number of correct choices given in the gift-exchange
relation). These workers give close to 10 correct answers more than all other workers which
deliver comparable outputs. Looking at the column “Ratio” leads towards an explanation.
Ratio, deﬁned as performance/productivity, captures to what extent workers realize their
productivity potential as elicited in the piece rate condition in part one. While trustworthy
11All results in this section are identical if we were to include the data from the two control session P and
T, but we want to exclude any possible eﬀect that the absence of one piece of information might have both
on ﬁrms and workers in what follows.
22types realize on average 91% of their potential as elicited with the productivity measure in the
piece rate task in part one, not trustworthy types achieve only between 60-71% on average.
Although they are now in a situation characterized by moral hazard and absent material
incentives, they still perform on average very close to their productivity. This is conﬁrmed
non-parametrically by Wilcoxon-signed-ranks-tests on the diﬀerence between productivity
and performance for each worker type separately. While there is no diﬀerence between the
two for trustworthy types (h0r1: p = 0.62, h1r1: p = 0.97), we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence
for the not trustworthy types (h1r0: p < 0.01, h0r0: p = 0.04). Hence low productive
but trustworthy workers generate substantial proﬁts because they make up for their low
productivity with their “work ethics”.
Wages are increasing in worker characteristics and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent according to the
worker type identiﬁed (Kruskal-Wallis-Test on session averages, p < 0.01) and we also ﬁnd
a diﬀerence in ﬁrms’ proﬁts (Kruskal-Wallis-Test on session averages, p = 0.02). The super-
additivity of these two characteristics produces highest levels of eﬃciency and performance
only if they both are present at the same time.
Result 4 Workers that have both characteristics – high productivity and trustworthiness –
provide signiﬁcantly higher levels of eﬀort which leads to higher ﬁrm proﬁts. In the absence of
at least one of the character traits, eﬀorts and ﬁrms’ proﬁts are substantially lower in a ﬁrm-
worker interaction. Trustworthy workers are more likely to live up to their full productivity
potential under moral hazard than not trustworthy workers.
--- Include Figure 4 about here. ---
Table 9 shows that on average ﬁrms reap higher proﬁts when interacting with trustworthy
workers. Inspecting the left panel of Figure 4 we see that in addition to an on average
higher performance, ﬁrms also have to bear less variability in output (performance) when a
trustworthy worker is employed. This translates into less dispersed proﬁts, too (right panel
of Figure 4). An interaction with a trustworthy worker very likely generates substantial
proﬁts, whereas with not trustworthy workers ﬁrms run the considerable risk of making
losses. The middle panel in Figure 4 shows that the median of the ”ratio“ variable for the
23two trustworthy types is even above the productivity measure, i.e. above one. For not
trustworthy types mean and median are substantially below this threshold. This pattern
further qualiﬁes why ﬁrms make as much proﬁt with low productive but trustworthy workers
as with high productive but not trustworthy workers. While the former are less able, they
are able to compensate the ability gap through superior levels of “morale” producing lower
variability in output. We sum up these ﬁndings in our next result:
Result 5 Trustworthy workers generate not only higher but also less variable proﬁts for
ﬁrms.
--- Include Figure 5 about here. ---
The heterogeneity in the Ratio variable leads to the pattern captured in Figure 5: Perfor-
mance in our labor market (right panel) is substantially more dispersed than productivity
in the piece rate task (left panel). The reason for this is that heterogeneity in the trustwor-
thiness dimension – which is orthogonal to the productivity characteristic – aﬀects behavior
under moral hazard. These results are a cautionary tale for us how to interpret ability
measures elicited in the labor market. We end this section by trying to better understand
what exactly drives these diﬀerent behavioral responses. Since ﬁrms cannot actively choose
their worker in our design, but are allocated a worker at random and can only oﬀer diﬀerent
wages, we next proceed to analyzing how the diﬀerent types of workers react to an oﬀered
wage. I.e., we want to understand whether there are diﬀerences in the nature of gift exchange
across the four worker types.
--- Include Figure 6 about here. ---
In Figure 6 we plot a ﬁrm’s proﬁt against the implemented wage separately for the four
worker types. It can be seen that for high productivity and trustworthy workers the level
of performance is higher than for the others, but surprisingly proﬁt does not increase in the
wage for these types. The highly signiﬁcant constant (p = 0.01) together with a virtually
ﬂat wage-proﬁt relation for these types further illustrates the unconditional level of worker
24performance and ﬁrm proﬁts in interactions with high productivity and trustworthy subjects.
For the remaining three types, we ﬁnd a positive wage-proﬁt-relationship, that albeit starts
on a substantially lower level. It is only for the low productive and reciprocal types that
the wage-proﬁt relationship is signiﬁcantly positive (p = 0.014). For the not trustworthy
subjects the slope is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0.
Taken together, the results from the ﬁrm-worker interaction suggest that some form of gift-
exchange robustly generates above minimum proﬁts across all identiﬁed types of workers.
For the high productivity and trustworthy subjects it apparently suﬃces to make them a
sizable wage oﬀer. They are inclined to reciprocate and it is not hard for them to deliver the
return gift. However, they do not react to a further increase of the wage oﬀer. In contrast,
all remaining types exhibit positive wage-eﬀort relations, but only for trustworthy workers
this relation is robust. Worker types aﬀect ﬁrm proﬁts and are rightly taken into account
by ﬁrms when writing contracts. Only if information about worker types is available, ﬁrms
can increase their proﬁts by tailoring the corresponding wage level to a speciﬁc worker.
Exploiting the interaction between the incentive scheme and worker types therefore crucially
depends on the amount of information accessible to ﬁrms before writing contracts.
Result 6 Gift exchange is present for all types, but is most proﬁtable for ﬁrms in the in-
teraction with trustworthy types. Optimal wages depend on worker characteristics such that
information about workers is valuable for ﬁrms to tailor incentives to worker types.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presents evidence from a laboratory gift-exchange experiment indicating that
ﬁrms condition their wage policies on available information about worker productivity and
worker’s trustworthiness. Firms oﬀer more generous wages to workers who are, according
to the elicited measures, more productive and more trustworthy. Our results suggest that
workers with higher productivity and high levels of trustworthiness earn wage premia on the
labor market.
The availability of information has an impact on ﬁnal outcomes since ﬁrms can adapt con-
25tract oﬀers to speciﬁc worker types in order to make use of complementarities between wages
and types. Our results show that gift-exchange considerations play a role across all types,
but they are strongest for trustworthy workers. From the ﬁrm’s perspective, optimal wages
therefore depend on the worker’s type; proﬁts are highest for high-productivity workers who
are trustworthy. For the ﬁrm’s optimal contracting strategy, complementarities with respect
to diﬀerent worker characteristics are crucial.
While moral hazard is an important friction that governs contracts and incentives on labor
markets, we argue in this paper that there is a crucial interaction between worker heterogene-
ity and the contractual incompleteness of labor markets. The role of a worker’s individual
productivity for contracting outcomes has long been acknowledged. We show that if a ﬁrm
takes heterogeneity with respect to trustworthiness into account, it aﬀects the eﬀectiveness
of gift-exchange and hence its proﬁt levels. Since the interaction between worker types and
the solution to the moral hazard problem matters, the existence of information about worker
characteristics contains an economic value for ﬁrms even in the absence of competition for
workers. Given the resources spent on information acquisition by ﬁrms for the hiring deci-
sion, we consider the role and the acquisition of information on labor markets a ﬁeld of high
economic relevance and a promising topic for future research to foster our understanding of
the functioning of labor markets.
26Appendix: Elicitation of Expectations
In this appendix, we describe in details the elicitation of subjects’ expectations about the
characteristics in the population in an incentivized manner. After the elicitation of the
productivity and the trustworthiness measure, all participants are asked to estimate the
number of correct answers in the productivity task reported before. A correct guess of the
session average is rewarded with a prize of 100 EP, from which 10 points are deducted for
every correct answer that the guess was away from the true value. If the diﬀerence between
the guess and the true value exceeded 10 answers, subjects earned at worst 0 EP from this
part.12 In a similar vein, we ask subjects how many of the 24 subjects in their session
have chosen to reciprocate trust. Subjects are rewarded for the precision of their guesses
with a prize of 100 EP if their estimate was correct, and 20 points were deducted for every
subject that their guess was away from the true value. Hence, if their guess was more than
5 subjects away from the true value, earnings were 0 EP from this part. Expectations were
elicited referring to the current session (24 subjects) of the experiment, which we consider
suﬃciently large that subjects perceive their impact on the session average small enough to
enter their expectation about the whole population.
With no feedback about the choices of other participants, individual expectations about
the population are a likely candidate to explain the decision on contract choices later on.
The resolution of this part took also place at the end of the experiment, such that subjects
entered the gift exchange without any information about the behavior of other subjects in
the experiment.
--- Include Table A.1 about here. ---
We report in Table A.1 both subjects’ expectations and actual realizations in the three
treatments. As far as the number of correct choices in part one is concerned, subjects
underestimate the average number of correct outcomes by about 4 answers compared to
the true average value. This is conﬁrmed by a highly signiﬁcant Wilcoxon-signed-rank-test
12Subjects could only enter integer guesses and the average was rounded to an integer.
27between the own performance and the guess of the average productivity measure (p < 0.01).
Indeed, out of all 288 subjects, 213 give a lower expectation of the average than their own
coding performance in part one, 59 a higher one and 16 subjects consider themselves to be
average. Note however that at this point of the experiment, subjects do not know their
performance in part one explicitly but only implicitly from remembering how many correct
answers they gave.
--- Include Table A.2 about here. ---
When asked about the number of subjects that returned trust in their session, guesses are
more accurate and subjects correctly predict that a bit less than half of the participants chose
to return trust. To gain a deeper understanding of what drives the formation of expectations,
we regress expectations on behavior in part one and include the control treatments P and
T. From Table A.2 it is immediate to see that subjects are strongly (positively) inﬂuenced
by their past behavior, which is suggestive evidence for the false consensus eﬀect. For
estimating the average number of correct choices in the elicitation task, the own result is
highly signiﬁcant. In a similar manner, having trusted and returned trust oneself increases
one’s expectation of the number of subjects that return trust within a session signiﬁcantly.
Socio-demographics do not matter for expectations and we ﬁnd that there are no eﬀects from
a speciﬁc characteristic on expectations about the respective other characteristics.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on the Measure of Productivity
Treatment Mean S.D. N Median Min Max
PT 28.30 6.30 192 28.0 9 45
P 28.89 8.08 48 29.5 0 45
T 29.46 6.06 48 29.5 14 41
Total 28.59 6.58 288 29 0 45
This table contains descriptive statistics for coding performance in the real eﬀort task in Part 1, by treatment.
Table 2: Determinants of Productivity







Treatment P 0.967 0.972
(1.363) (1.367)
Treatment T 1.126 0.983
(1.008) (1.012)
Big Five (Extraversion) 0.339
(0.339)
Big Five (Agreableness) 0.874**
(0.394)
Big Five (Conscientiousness) -0.079
(0.354)
Big Five (Emotional Stability) 0.115
(0.343)






This table contains the estimates of OLS regressions predicting the number of correct answers in Part
1. Coeﬃcients show eﬀects relative to answers in the PT treatment. Quant is a dummy for quantitative
orientation of studies. All Big Five measures are on a scale from 1 to 7 indicating the strength of the
individual personality trait. Due to a server breakdown at the end of one P session, the values of the socio-
demographic variables are missing for one session (24 subjects). Standard Errors in brackets. *** represents
signiﬁcance at p = 0.01, ** at p = 0.05 and * at p = 0.10.
29Table 3: Descriptive Statistics on the Measure of Trustworthiness
Treatment no trust trust no trust trust Total
no returntrust no returntrust returntrust returntrust
PT 32.8% 18.2% 13.0% 35.9% 100%
P 35.4% 14.6% 6.3% 43.8% 100%
T 45.8% 16.7% 18.8% 18.8% 100%
Total 35.4% 17.4% 12.9% 34.4% 100%
This tables contains the percentage of subjects trusting and returning trust in the binary trust game in Part
1, by treatment.
Table 4: Determinants of Trustworthiness
Dep. Var.: 1 if Trustworthy I II III
Female 0.319* 0.327** 0.359*
(0.166) (0.166) (0.189)
Age 0.033* 0.036* 0.041**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Quant -0.365* -0.369* -0.353*
(0.189) (0.189) (0.193)
Treatment P 0.238 0.229 0.279
(0.281) (0.282) (0.286)
Treatment T -0.307 -0.319 -0.347
(0.209) (0.210) (0.214)
Big Five (Extraversion) 0.063
(0.071)
Big Five (Agreableness) 0.073
(0.082)
Big Five (Conscientiousness) -0.128*
(0.074)
Big Five (Emotional Stability) 0.067
(0.072)
Big Five (Openness) 0.015
(0.090)
# Correct Choices 0.009 0.007
(0.013) (0.013)
Constant -0.912* -1.262* -1.693*
(0.490) (0.879) (0.885)
Obs 264 264 264
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.05 0.06
This table contains the estimates of Probit regressions predicting trustworthiness in Part 1. Coeﬃcients show
eﬀects relative to answers in the PT treatment. Quant is a dummy for quantitative orientation of studies.
All Big Five measures are on a scale from 1 to 7 indicating the strength of the individual personality trait
with 1 being very weak and 7 being very strong. Due to a server breakdown at the end of one P session, we
are lacking the socio-demographic variables of one session (24 subjects). Standard Errors in brackets. ***
represents signiﬁcance at p = 0.01, ** at p = 0.05 and * at p = 0.10.
30Table 5: Determinants of the Wage Oﬀer
Dep. Var.: I II
Wage oﬀer PT PT
1 if high 26.591***
(2.780)
1 if trustworthy 10.263***
(1.875)
1 if high and trustworthy 36.932***
(2.707)
1 if high and not trustworthy 26.016***
(2.851)






This table contains the estimates of linear panel regressions predicting the wage oﬀer with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
Standard errors (clustered on the session level) in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at p = 0.01, ** at
p = 0.05 and * at p = 0.10.
Table 6: Determinants of the Wage Oﬀer Including Firm Characteristics
Dep. Var.: I II
Wage oﬀer PT PT
1 if high productive worker 26.592*** 26.602***
(2.781) (2.787)
1 if trustworthy worker 10.243*** 10.254***
(1.867) (1.868)
1 if high (ﬁrm) -1.182 -3.092
(7.943) (10.424)












This table contains the estimates of linear panel regressions predicting the wage oﬀer with ﬁrm random
eﬀects. Standard errors (clustered on the session level) in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at p = 0.01,
** at p = 0.05 and * at p = 0.10.
31Table 7: Determinants of the Wage Oﬀer in the Control Treatments P and T
Dep. Var.: I II
Wage oﬀer Treatment P Treatment T
Worker Productivity 3.204*** 0.109
(0.021) (0.022)






This table contains the estimates of linear panel regressions predicting the wage oﬀer with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
Firms are shown the productivity measure of Part 1 as a continuous variable. Return trust is a dummy
variable for worker behavior in Part 1. Standard errors (clustered on the session level) in brackets. ***
represents signiﬁcance at p = 0.01, ** at p = 0.05 and * at p = 0.10.
Table 8: Determinants of Eﬀort




1 if productive 0.677 6.007** 2.869
(2.424) (2.442) (6.136)
1 if trustworthy 4.467** 5.788** 5.465
(2.164) (2.409) (5.173)
Wage × 1 if productive -0.028
(0.065)








Constant 6.075** 16.149*** 9.787
(3.864) (2.037) (7.237)
Obs 96 96 96
R2 0.30 0.11 0.41
This table contains the estimates of OLS regressions predicting the number of correct choices in the gift
exchange game. Standard errors (clustered on the session level) in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at
p = 0.01, ** at p = 0.05 and * at p = 0.10.
32Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Contracts in the PT treatment
Worker Type
PT treatment
Performance Ratio Firm’s Proﬁts Wage Obs
high productivity & trustworthy (h1r1) 29.9 91 % 171.4 102.8 20
high productivity & not trustworthy (h1r0) 20.3 60 % 100.9 97.0 20
low productivity & trustworthy (h0r1) 20.7 91 % 123.9 71.7 30
low productivity & not trustworthy (h0r0) 17.6 71 % 102.3 61.7 26
Total 21.7 79 % 135.9 80.7 96
This table contains descriptive statistics of all contracts for the four diﬀerent worker types in the PT treat-
ment. Ratio is deﬁned as performance/productivity.
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics on Expectations
Treatment # Correct Choices # Correct Choices # Returntrust # Returntrust
realized expected realized (per session) expected (per session)
PT 28.3 23.6 11.7 10.7
P 28.9 23.9 12 10.5
T 29.5 26.0 9 9.8
Total 28.6 24.3 11.3 10.5
This table reports sample averages of subjects’ expectations and of the realizations of productivity and
trustworthiness.
Table A.2: Determinants of Expectations
Dep. Var.: Dep. Var.:
Expected Average of Correct Choices Expected # Subjects Returning Trust
# Correct Choices 0.512*** -0.052
(0.051) (0.049)
1 if trust -0.311 2.665***
(0.688) (0.664)






Treatment P -0.204 -0.409
(1.115) (1.076)






This tables contains estimates of OLS regressions predicting expectations. Coeﬃcients show eﬀects relative
to answers in the PT treatment. Trust and returntrust are dummy variables for behavior in part one. Due
to a server breakdown at the end of one P session, we are lacking the socio-demographic variables of one
session (24 subjects). Standard errors in brackets. *** represents signiﬁcance at p = 0.01, ** at p = 0.05
and * at p = 0.10..
33Figure 1: Trust Game
Graphic representation of the trust game as shown to subjects. Subjects had to choose as person X (ﬁrst
mover) and as person Y (second mover), where at each point they could choose between ”left“ and ”right“.
The corresponding payoﬀs are given in experimental points (EP), with the ﬁrst mover’s payoﬀ listed ﬁrst.
34Figure 2: Histogram of Productivity in Part 1
Histogram of productivity measured in Part 1 (number of correct answers); all treatments (PT, P, T)
combined.
Figure 3: Boxplot of Productivity in Part 1
Boxplot of productivity measured in Part 1, stratiﬁed by worker characteristics elicited in Part 1, productivity
(left panel) and trustworthiness (right panel). Graphs show the median, 25th and 75th as well as 5th and
95th percentile.
35Figure 4: Boxplot of Performance, Ratio, and Proﬁts in Part 3
Boxplots of performance, ratio (performance/productivity), and proﬁts measured in Part3, stratiﬁed by
worker types elicited in Part 1: high productivity & trustworthy (h1r1); high productivity & not trustworthy
(h1r0); etc.). Graphs show the median, 25th and 75th as well as 5th and 95th percentile.
Figure 5: Histogram of Productivity and Performance
Histogram of the productivity measure (left panel) and the performance measure (right panel) in treatment
PT. Frequencies according to worker trustworthiness.
36Figure 6: Wage-Proﬁt Relationships
Scatterplot of the wage-proﬁt relation for four identiﬁed types in PT. ”h1r1“ stands for high productivity
and a subject that returned trust. h1r0, h0r1 and h0r0 are deﬁned accordingly. The shaded areas indicate
the 95 % conﬁdence interval around the linear regression line.
37Screenshots
Screenshot S.1: Real-eﬀort Task
Screenshot of the real-eﬀort task: The key is shown in the upper half of the screen, the matching is done in
the lower half of the screen. Subjects had 30 seconds for each of the three screens.
38Screenshot S.2: Wage Entry Screen for Firms
Wage entry screen for ﬁrms: Worker Characteristics are shown in brackets; ﬁrms enter one wage for every
worker.
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This experiment serves the investigation of economic decision making. In the experiment you and other 
participants
1 of the experiments are asked to make decisions. You can thereby earn money. Your decisions as 
well as the decisions of other participants determine your earnings from the experiment according to the rules 
explained below. 
 
The whole experiment approximately lasts 1 hour and 15 minutes and consists of four parts. First of all, you 
receive the instructions for part I. Instructions for parts II to IV are handed out to you at the beginning of the 
respective parts. For each part you are asked to enter  your decisions into the computer. The parts are not 
independent of each other. This implies that decisions taken in one part of the experiment may sometimes (not 
always) affect other parts of the experiment. 
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions after reading through the instructions of during the experiment. 
One of the experimenters will then come to you and answer your questions in private.  
 
While making your decisions, there is a clock counting down in the right upper corner of your computer screen. 
This clock serves as a guide for how much time it should take you. You may, of course, exceed the time limits. 
Once time has run out, it is only the pure information screens which will be dismissed as they do not ask you to 
make any decisions. 
 
Payment 
At the beginning of the experiment you receive 4 Euro for arriving on time. During the experiment you can earn 
more money by collecting points. At the end of the experiment, the points get converted into Euro at the 
exchange rate of 
 
1 Point = 0.0125 Euro (1.25 EUROCENT) 
that is 1 Euro = 80 Points 
 
At the end of the experiment the amount of money you earned during the experiment as well as your 4 
Euro starting balance will be paid to you in cash. 
 
Anonymity 
At no point during or after the experiment you will find out with whom you interact and the identity of 
other participants. In turn, other participants will not find out your identity and your earnings at any 
point during or after the experiment. There is a possibility that decisions you took in [PT: parts I and II] [P: 
part I] [T: part II] are made public to other participants in later parts of the experiment. Please note that your 
identity remains secret all the same. 
 
It is strictly prohibited to communicate with other participants during the experiment. Furthermore, please 
note that you may only use the functions of the computer that are part of the experiment. Communication or 
playing around with the computer results in exclusion from the experiment.  
 
 
                                                 
1 For convenience, we only use male terms in the instructions. They should be considered as being gender neutral. 
Instructions (translated from German)
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Part I 
 
During the first part of the experiment you are asked to link terms to the numerical codes corresponding to them. 






















The upper part of the screen shows a code key that links specific terms to specific codes. The numerical code 
always consists of four digits. In the lower part of the screen, you have to assign terms to their respective 
numerical codes. For each term there are four possible codes, displayed as options a) to d), but only a single one 
code among the listed one is correct. Please click on the correct numerical code for each of the terms. The order 
of terms as shown in the key code is identical to the order of terms in the assignment task. 
  
There are always 15 terms per screen and you are given 30 seconds per screen. This means that after 30 seconds 
there is a new screen that pops up and contains 15 new terms and codes. In total, you are given 90 seconds 
for the numerical code tasks, i.e. three different screens pop up one after the other. 
The order in which you assign terms to their corresponding codes does not play a role. You may skip terms and 
you may go back to change your old decisions. All terms that you were not able to assign before the screen 
disappears after 30 seconds do not count for your final payment determination.  
 
For every correct answer you receive 10 points. For each wrong answer you get a deduction of 10 points. You 
may not run into a loss however, i.e. it’s not possible to get minus points and in the worst case your earnings 
amount to 0 points in this part of the experiment. The difference between correct and wrong answers is called 
correct assignments.  
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Correct assignments = # correct answers – # wrong answers 
 
You will only find out about your performance and thus about the amount of points you earned in this part of the 
experiment at the very end of the experiment. Your earnings from this part of the experiment correspond to 
the sum of all points that you earned by giving correct answers reduced by the points that got deducted for 
each wrong answer. 
  
Example 1: You achieve 26 correct answers and 2 wrong answers. Your earnings amount to (26-2) * 10 = 240 
points. 
 
Example 2: You achieve 8 correct answers and 12 wrong answers. Your earnings are 0 points. 
  
There will be a 60 second trial run of the numerical code task before the start of the experiment in order to get 
familiar with the computer program. The trail run is not part of the experiment and does not influence your final 
payments. 
 
Part II  
(parts and instructions were presented sequentially to subjects) 
 
During the second part of the experiment you are asked to make two decisions, both of which refer to the 
following situation. Numbers correspond to the earnings in points from this part, and they are labelled in a way 













Person X chooses between “left” and “right”. If he decides for “left”, person X himself and person Y receive 120 
points respectively from this part of the experiment. If he decides on “right”, it is person Y who decides on the 
final earning points in this part. If person Y chooses “left”, person X receives 80 points and person Y receives 
320 points. If he chooses “right”, person X and person Y receive 200 points respectively from this part of the 
experiment. 
 
You do not know whether you are person X or person Y. The decision is made by the computer at the end 
of the experiment only. You thus have to make two decisions: The first decision is implemented if you end up 
becoming person X (“left” or “right”). The second decision is implemented if you end up becoming person Y 
(“left“ or “right”). At the end of the experiment the type of person (X or Y) is randomly assigned to you. Also, 
there is another participant who is randomly assigned to you and who takes on the respective other type of person. 
X 
Y  (120/120) 
(80/320)  (200/200) 
left  right 
left
   
right 
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It is only your decision of your randomly assigned person type that is relevant for your final earnings. This 
means that if you end up being person X (or Y), the decision that you took as person X (or Y) is relevant 
only.  The final earnings from this part of the experiments are therefore not found out until the end of the 
experiment. 
  
Please type your decisions into the computer and confirm by clicking OK. As long as you haven’t used the OK 




During the third part of the experiment you are asked for your assessment concerning all participants’ past 
behaviour in parts I and II. The better your estimates for the average outcomes in the first two parts, the 
more money you earn in part III. You are asked to estimate two outcomes. 
  
Estimate 1: How did the participants in part I of this experiment perform on average? As a reminder, part I dealt 
with the numerical code task. Please enter your estimate for the average number of correct assignments of 
all participants in part I on your screen. As defined in part I, the number of „correct assignments“ refers to the 
number of correct answers net of the number of wrong answers. 
  
If your estimate is correct, you receive 100 points. Points will be reduced in case your estimate deviates 
from the true value. 10 points are taken away for each assignment that your estimate deviates from the true 
average of all participants.  For example, in case your estimate deviates from the true value by one correct 
assignment, you receive 90 points. In case your estimate deviates from the true value by two correct assignments, 
you receive 80 points, etc. In case your estimate deviates by 10 or more correct assignments, you receive 0 points. 
You are informed on the true average and on your earnings from this part of the experiment only at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Example 1: You estimate the average to be 20 correct assignments. The true average is 17 correct assignments. 
Your estimate thus deviates from the true average by 3 correct assignments. Consequently, you earn 100 – 3*10 
= 70 points.  
 
Example 2: You estimate the average to be 9 correct assignments. The true average is 22 correct assignments. 
Your estimate thus deviates from the true average by 13 correct assignments. Consequently, you earn 0 points.  
  
Estimation 2: How many of the 24 participants of this experiment chose "right“ being person Y in part II? 
Please enter your estimate for the average number of correct assignments of all participants in part I on your 
screen. If your estimate is correct, you receive 100 points. 20 points are taken away for each participant that 
your estimate deviates from the true number of participants choosing “right”. For example, in case your estimate 
deviates from the true number of participants by one participant, you receive 80 points. In case your estimate 
deviates from the true number by two participants, you receive 60 points, etc. In case your estimate deviates by 5 
or more participants, you receive 0 points.  
You are informed on the true number of participants and on your earnings from this part of the experiment only at 
the end of the experiment. 
 























Example 1: You estimate the number of participants that chose “right” being person Y to be 16. The true number 
is 14 participants. Your estimate thus deviates from the true number by 2 participants. Consequently, you earn 
100 – 2*20 = 60 points. 
  
Example 2: You estimate the number of participants that chose “right” being person Y to be 5. The true number 
is 12 participants. Your estimate thus deviates from the true number by 7 participants. Consequently, you earn 0 
points. 
 
Please note: The decision that participants took being person X does not play a role for this part. Your estimate 
merely concerns the decision that all 24 participants took being person Y. The type of person that is randomly 
assigned to the participants at the end of the experiment is irrelevant to this part. Your estimate should refer to all 




During the fourth part of the experiment, the computer randomly assigns a type of person to you. There are two 
types of persons, employers and employees. 
  
Brief overview of part IV of the experiment: 
Part IV of the experiment consists of two stages. The stages are structured as following: 
 
1.  Employers and employees sign an employment contract. In the first stage employers thus state which 
wage level they are willing to pay to which employee. 
2.  In the second stage of this part, each employer is randomly assigned to an employee who, once again, is 
given 90 seconds to solve the numerical code task of part I for the employer. The number of correct 




There are 24 participants in this room, i.e. there are exactly 12 employers and 12 employees. On the first screen 
of this part you are told which type of person you are (employer or employee). 
X 
Y  (120/120) 
(80/320)  (200/200) 
left  right 
left  right 
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1.  Determination of wages 
 
In a first step, employers state which wage level they are willing to pay to which of the 12 employees in return for 
them solving the numerical code task in stage 2 of this part. For this purpose, employers get two pieces of 
information about each employee: The number of correct assignments (# correct answers – # wrong answers) 
from part I of the experiment, and the decision of the employees that he took being person Y in the decision 
situation of part II of the experiment. 
 






















The order of listed employees is random. Information on each employee’s behaviour in [PT: parts I and II] 
[P: part I] [T: part II] of the experiment are provided in brackets to the employers.  
[PT: If an employee achieved more correct assignments than the average in part one, he belongs to “group 
yellow”. If he achieved less than the average in part one, he belongs to “group blue”.] [P: The number of 
correct assignments in part one is given in brackets] [T: The decision in part two is given in brackets] 
 
For example, the employee [PT:  (group yellow, right),  P:  (5),  T:  (right)]  [PT: achieved  more  correct 
assignments than the average in part I] [P: achieved 5 correct assignments in part I] and [PT/T decided on “right” 
in the decision scenario of part II]. Correspondingly, the employee [PT: (group blue, left), P: (13), T: (left)] [PT: 
achieved less correct assignments than the average in part I] [P: achieved 13 correct assignments in part I] and 
[PT/T decided on “left” in the decision scenario of part II]. 
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Wage levels should be entered in the box labelled “Your wage offer“. The offer may not be smaller than 0 and 
exceed 250: 
0 ≤ wage offer ≤ 250 
 
Employers may enter a different wage level in each box or the same wage level for everyone or for some of the 
employees.  Employers have to fill in every box, i.e. they are required to make a wage offer to every 
employee.  
Employers find out which employee is allocated to them only in the second stage of this part. The allocation is 
done by the computer. An employer can get allocated to any employee. 
  
Example: An employer offers a wage of 70 to the employee [PT: (group yellow, right), P: (5), T: (right)] and a 
wage of 130 to the employee [PT: (group blue, left), P: (13), T: (left)]. In case the employer gets allocated to the 
employee [PT: (group yellow, right), P: (5), T: (right)], the employer is required to pay him a wage of 70 in 
return for the employee performing the numerical code task.. In case the employer gets allocated to the employee 
[PT: (group blue, left), P: (13), T: (left)], the employer is required to pay a wage of 130. 
  
While employers enter their wage offers, employees are asked to state their wage expectations and how certain 
they are on their expectations. 
 
2.  Task stage 
 
One employee gets allocated to one employer for each task stage. The employee receives a wage in return 
for performing the numerical code task. Again, employees are given 90 seconds to this end. 
 
In this setting, the wage corresponds to the one level offered by an employer to the respective employee in 
the previous stage. Earnings of an employer are determined by the number of correct answers net of wrong 
answers which is achieved by the employee in the numerical code task. 
 
Employees do not find out to which employer they are allocated.  Before starting the  numerical code task, 
employees only find out the wage that they get paid.  
Employers are shown the information on the employees that got allocated to them on their screens.  
 
While employees work on the numerical code task, employers are asked to state their expectations on the number 
of correct answers of their employee and how certain they are on their expectations.  
 
How are earnings determined? 
Earnings of employers: 
•  Earnings of employers depend on the number of correct answers of their respective employee (net of wrong 
answers) as well as on the wage they offered to pay to their employee. Earnings are determined in the 
following way:  
 
Earnings of an employer =  
10 points * (# correct answers – # wrong answers) – wage 
 
The employer receives 10 points for each correct answer of their employee (net of wrong answers). He is required 
to pay the wage to the employee from this revenue. Earnings of employers are thus higher the more correct 
46PT/P/T 
Page 8 of 8 
assignments their employee scores. Earnings of employers are lower the fewer correct assignments their 
employee score.  
In case the employee has given more wrong answers than correct ones, revenues of the employer amount to 
0 points in the worst case. But in any case, the employer is required to pay the wage to the employee. 
 
Earnings of employees 
•  Earnings of  employees  are  the wages that they receive  from their  respective  employer. Earnings are 
determined in the following way:  
 
Earnings of an employee = wage 
 
Earnings of employees are thus independent of the number of correct and wrong answers in the numerical code 
task. 
 
Earnings of all employers and employees are determined in the same way. Consequently, every employee is 
able to compute the earnings of the employer he works for.  
Please note, that, in principle, it is possible to incur losses. You are required to settle losses using your show-up 
fee or earnings from other parts of the experiment.  
 
Example 1: An employer offers a wage of 110 points to an employee and is allocated to this particular employee. 
If the employee achieves 21 correct and 2 wrong answers, the employer’s earnings amount to: 
10 * (21 – 2) – 110 = 10 * 19 – 110 = 190 – 110 = 80 
The employee receives his wage of 110 points. 
 
Example 2 An employer offers a wage of 80 points to an employee and is allocated to this particular employee. If 
the employee achieves 35 correct and 0 wrong answers, the employer’s earnings amount to: 
10 * (35 – 0) – 80 = 10 * 35 – 80 = 350 – 80 = 270 
The employee receives his wage of 80 points. 
 
Example 3: An employer offers a wage of 200 points to an employee and is allocated to this particular employee. 
If the employee achieves 15 correct and 4 wrong answers, the employer’s earnings amount to: 
10 * (15 – 4) – 200 = 10 * 11 – 200 = 110 – 200 = – 90 
This loss has to be settled with earnings from other parts of the experiment or the starting balance. The employee 
receives his wage of 200 points 
 
You are informed on your earnings as well as the earnings of your partner at the end of part IV on a particular 
screen showing your earnings: 
 
This screen contains the following information: 
  Information on the employee from parts I and II of the experiment 
  Number of correct assignments (# of correct answers – # wrong answers) of the employee 
  Earnings of the employee (wage) 
  Earnings of the employer 
 
The experiment does not start until all participants have become familiar with the exact calculations of earnings. 
For this purpose, we kindly ask you to solve several practice exercises on your screens beforehand. Please raise 
your hand in case you have any questions. 
 
At the very end of the experiment, the computer calculates your final earnings from parts I to IV and provides you 
with detailed earning information for each part of the experiment on the screen. 
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